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A REVERSAL OF PERSPECTIVE: THE SUBJECT 
AS CITIZEN UNDER ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, 
OR THE AMBIGUITY OF NOTIONS
E
urope has never had a single definition for the term ‘citizen.’ Indeed, over
the centuries the significance of this term has undergone far−reaching 
evolution. In different historical periods, different states, and different
European languages, this term has had diverse meanings and has been used in
varying contexts. The concept of ‘citizen’ has repeatedly been defined anew
depending upon specific political, social, and economic conditions. At various
periods, the term ‘citizen’ has related to a wider or narrower portion of a given
state’s society. The criteria by which an individual was said to form a part of the
body of citizens have also differed. The changes which have taken place in the
definition of a ‘citizen’ over the centuries are enormous.1
This is not to say, however, that there has been no common core to the 
concept of citizen as it has taken shape over the course of hundreds of years. As
far back as ancient times, a member of the state could influence the shaping of
that state’s authorities and could participate in government. It is the Aristotelian
concept of the citizen – a concept that has influenced all historical models of 
citizenship since – which is at the root of the citizen understood as a political 
1 To mention just a few examples: Draco’s laws in the 7th century B.C. called soldiers 
‘citizens’ and made the granting of full citizenship rights to men dependent upon their ability
to arm themselves. In Athens, possession of citizenship was later dependent on the criterion of
origin, whereas Rome made it dependent on the place of birth. In the Middle Ages, in 
principle, only a city dweller who was a holder of property could enjoy full citizenship rights.
The modern spread of political rights to men in the state in Europe actually begins with the
French Revolution. In the 20th century, women became citizens, and contemporarily the idea
of citizenship has become enriched with notions having to do with social rights. We have
entered the 21st century with the supra−national institution of European citizenship. The 
term ‘citizen’ is no longer associated only with membership in a state or city, but also with
belonging to an association of states.
animal (politikon zoon). In addition, personal freedom has always been a sine qua
non for possessing citizen status. Thus, a citizen has always been, and remains,
the opposite of a slave. It has also come to be accepted that citizenship implies
the primacy of an individual’s rights in a state over an individual’s obligations to
that state. The polar opposite of this situation in the historical dimension is 
subjection to the monarch in an absolute monarchy. Thus the ‘citizen’ also stands
in opposition to the ‘subject.’
When speaking of the historical models containing the said ‘citizenship traits’
of a person’s status in the state, we usually refer to the model of the citizen in
ancient times, in medieval municipal citizenship, and in modern times, in the
fully−formed nation−state. It is difficult to imagine a citizen in an absolute monarchy,
and in a world of subjection. Still, it is possible to give rein to one’s imagination
and perceive citizens in such a setting; one could even go a step further and call
the subject of an absolute monarch a citizen. But is imagination truly necessary
in order to conduct such a seemingly obvious reversal of perspective? 
On absolutism, the nation and nationality, subjection 
and its anti−citizenship nature 
Absolute monarchy began to take shape in Europe in the 16th century and
developed fully over the following two centuries. In absolutism, state power was
almost exclusively concentrated in the hands of an autocratic monarch who 
single−handedly laid down the law in keeping with the rule quod principi placuit,
legis habet vigorem. Such a ruler was not subject to anyone’s control; although
he directed the entirety of the state’s affairs, he was only responsible before God,
by whose grace and will he fulfilled his supposed earthly mission. The ruler’s
executive authority was exercised through an extensive administrative apparatus,
functioning on the principles of centralism and bureaucracy. This helped reinforce
the ruler’s position. Professional functionaries, who answered only to the
monarch, replaced the old noblesse d’épée which – in the older tradition of an
estate monarchy – had grown used to a wider decision−making role in state affairs.
From the perspective of the individual’s place in the state, this shift was of
momentous significance. The emergence of the absolute monarchy at the time of
the Renaissance transformations signalled the beginning of the slow demise of the
estate order. A definite sign of change was the growing tendency to codify law,
which became, by a long and slow process, universal and nationwide – although
certainly not the same for everyone.2 The fact that the absolute ruler also played
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2 We are speaking here of the equality of all state inhabitants before penal, not civil law.
See J. Bardach, ‘Czy istniało obywatelstwo w szlacheckiej Rzeczypospolitej?’ [‘Did Citizenship
Exist in the Nobles’ Commonwealth?’], Czasopismo Prawno−Historyczne [Legal and Historical
Journal], No. 2, 1965: 263.
the role of legislator in the new political system constituted a real qualitative
change. He who had formerly been an arbiter, cognizant of all the laws and their
executor, now became the sole legislator. 
The classic example of these changes is provided by France, where the 
king initially reinforced his power on the basis of, as Z. Izdebski called it,3
a ‘temporary community of interests,’ that is, an alliance with the increasingly
affluent burgher class and with the middle nobility, an alliance which was directed
against the upper aristocracy. The increasingly powerful third estate thus became
a natural rival of the feudal lords, a situation which led to the rise of antagonisms,
which were used by the monarch to consolidate his position as autocrat and
arbiter. A characteristic trait of the maturing process of absolute monarchy was the
gradual curtailment or wholesale elimination of estate assemblies, which 
had thrived during the Middle Ages. The dismantling of the estate parliaments
facilitated the emergence of permanent mercenary armies, which the ruler 
maintained from taxes. Such armies’ primary role was to protect the state from 
foreign threats to its security, but they could also be used quite effectively to 
overcome the resistance of internal forces hostile to the monarch. 
The monarch’s omnipotence went hand in hand with a general conviction 
that society was not mature enough to make decisions in matters that affected it
directly.4 The rise of absolutism occurred in conjunction with limitations on the
rights of individuals who, in the Middle Ages, could have been called citizens if
they possessed city liberties, or could have been called so in the wider Aristotelian
sense, if they had an influence on, or shared in the power of, the central 
authorities.5 During the period of absolutism, the people, in principle, could 
influence neither the choice of authorities nor the law laid down by the king and
carried out in his name.
This apparently backward state of affairs, however, had solid foundations 
on which to persist and even develop. Paradoxically, in its initial stages at least,
absolutism based its power on the trust and expectations of a large portion of the
state’s inhabitants. During the Reformation and Counter−Reformation, severe
monarchical rule was an answer to the needs of a time when Europe was fraught
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3 See Z. Izdebski, ‘Poglądy Jana Bodinusa na państwo i prawo’ [‘Jean Bodin’s Views on the
State and Law’] in J. Bodin, Sześć ksiąg o Rzeczypospolitej [Six livres de la république],
(Warsaw, 1958) VIII.
4 For more on this subject, see F. Koneczny, Państwo i prawo w cywilizacji łacińskiej [The
State and Law in Latin Civilization], (Komorów, 1997) 59; G. del Vecchio, ‘Osobowość i prawa
człowieka w świetle nauki prawa’ [‘Personhood and Human Rights in Light of the Study of
Law’] in M. Szyszkowska, ed., Zarys filozofii prawa [An Outline of the Philosophy of Law],
(Białystok, 2000) 267.
5 For more on this subject, see K. Trzciński, Obywatelstwo w Europie. Z dziejów idei i insty−
tucji [Citizenship in Europe: The History of the Idea and the Institution], (Warsaw, 2006) 
65–99.
with wars of religion, and its Christian civilization was threatened from without
by the dynamic spread of Islam in the Balkans.
Absolutism, as a powerful force defending the internal and external stability of
the state, the security and property of the ruler’s subjects, and also the interests of
the burgher class in the growth of trade and industries, came, in a way, to stand
guard over the prosperity of the state and its inhabitants – as well as protecting
state unity in the face of, as G. Jellinek put it,6 ‘centrifugal forces, imbedded in the
different tendencies of the estates.’ The system of absolute power was a substitute
of sorts for the general freedom of man and of the citizen. 
Beyond the political givens of absolutism, the wide horizon of Renaissance
humanism, with its interest in the human being for itself, appeared.7 Absolutism
was certainly not, of course, a product of Renaissance humanism, but neither 
was it, in spite of its many limitations, in direct contradiction with it. Norman
Davies has pointed out that in the field of politics, it is precisely Renaissance
humanism that represented the beginnings of the independent modern state, since
‘the sovereign nation−state is the collective counterpart of the autonomous human
person.’8 Absolutism, which flourished in the time of the Renaissance, and the
growing tendency to see the state – in keeping with the model of ancient Rome –
as a sovereign entity identified with the monarchy, contributed to the process of
national integration in Europe. The humanistic individualism of the human being
corresponded to an ever stronger sense of the distinctness of the nation as 
a community of people inhabiting a specific state defined territorially (customarily
ruled over by a home−grown monarch or dynasty),9 possessing a common 
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6 J. Jellinek, ‘Ogólna nauka o państwie’ [‘General Studies on the State’], Vol. III, Nauka 
o państwie z punktu widzenia prawnego [Studies on the State from the Legal Viewpoint],
(Warsaw, 1924) 315.
7 The arts, literature, or university life often constituted a substitute for a number of individual
rights. B. Truchlińska, ‘Człowiek – obywatel ‘republiki muz’’ [‘The Human Being – Citizen of
the ‘Republic of Muses’’] in M. Szyszkowska, ed., Człowiek jako obywatel [Man as Citizen],
(Warsaw, 1995) 161, in writing of the humanistic version of the citizen as a ‘concept of
mankind as a citizen of the world of human works’ described this surrogate for citizens’ rights
beautifully. The individual in the authoritarian setting of the Renaissance period could be seen
as homo creator, who finds an outlet for his existential needs in the field of art and culture, an
area – the only one – where a human being’s talents or tastes could be properly exposed. 
8 N. Davies, Europe: A History, (Oxford, 1996) 479. B. Zientara, Świt narodów europejskich.
Powstanie świadomości narodowej na obszarze Europy pokarolińskiej [The Dawn of European
Nations: The Emergence of National Consciousness in Post−Carolingian Europe], (Warsaw, 1985)
11, searches for the roots of the nation−state as early as in the Middle Ages, but he also seems to
incline to the opinion that it is in the days of Renaissance absolutism that ‘medieval universalism,
the unified ‘Christianitas’ increasingly fell apart [to form] nations and nation−states.’
9 For more on this subject, see E. Renan, ‘Co to jest naród’ [‘Qu’est−ce que c’est qu’un 
nation?’] in L. Zdybel, ed., Być w narodzie. Szkice o idei narodu, narodowej kulturze i nacjo−
nalizmie [To Be in a Nation: An Outline of the Idea of the Nation, National Culture, and 
Nationalism], (Lublin, 1998) 202. 
historical past, a same or similar culture,10 usually a common language and faith,
and, perhaps, even common spiritual bonds.11 However, the nation−forming
process usually took place on the basis of a fully formed ethnic community.12
Nationality, in the sense of belonging to a specific nation, understood as 
ethno−cultural community, increasingly became nationality conceived in the
sense of being a member of a particular state, regardless of ethnic descent.13
In the time of absolutism, such nationality of the entirety of a given state’s
inhabitants, with their subordination to the sovereign state authority, personified
by the monarch, is called subjection. This subjection was fundamentally different
from the serfdom characteristic of feudal (estate) monarchy, which was primarily
related to the system of property and land use, and where the centre of gravity
oscillated around the dependence of serfs on landed proprietors. In the system of
serfdom, exploited peasants sought refuge in cities, which usually ensured them
personal freedom, and initially even gave them citizenship. In the subjection of
the absolutist period the sovereign was the only ruler, and all the inhabitants of
the state he ruled over were his subjects. There was no escape from dependence
upon the centre here, unless it was to fall under the absolute authority of another
monarch. The shaping of the state of subjection, understood as the equality of all
subjects before the ruler, constituted an important step on the road to weakening
the estate and feudal order, although it did not eliminate either of these phenomena
entirely. The new type of subordination practically eliminated feudal relations in
the west of Europe, but it did not bring an end to the serf’s dependence on the 
feudal lord (rather one can speak in this context of a change from relations based
on servitude to those based on rents), but, at the same time, it made the feudal
lords themselves much more dependent on the monarch. All subjects were
dependent on the centralized monarchical authority and were subjected to 
its administrative measures. The essence of this dependence was the strong
emphasis placed upon the rights of the state,14 and the obligations of the subjects.
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10 See F. Znaniecki, Współczesne narody [Modern Nationalities: A Sociological Study],
(Warsaw, 1990) 13, and 40–41. See also E. Gellner, Narody i nacjonalizm [Nations and
Nationalism], (Warsaw, 1991) 16. 
11 See E. Renan, op. cit., 209–210. See also S. Jedynak, ‘Refleksje historyka myśli społecznej
w sprawie problematyki narodu, czyli Est modus in rebus’ [‘Reflections of a Historian of Social
Thought on the Question of the Nation, or Est modus in rebus’] in L. Zdybel, ed., op. cit., 16.
12 For more on this subject, see J. Maritain, Człowiek i państwo [L’Homme et l’État],
(Cracow, 1993) 11–12; D. Miller, ‘The Ethical Significance of Nationality,’ Ethics, No. 4, 1988:
656; and F. Znaniecki, op. cit., 10.
13 See Z. Sokolewicz, ‘Obywatelstwo a narodowość. Uwagi w związku z ustanowieniem oby−
watelstwa Unii Europejskiej’ [‘Citizenship and Nationality: Observations in Connection with the
Institution of European Union Citizenship’], Studia Europejskie [European Studies], No. 1, 1997: 25.
14 In the period, the state can be treated as synonymous with the ruler representing it. The
best example of this is to be found in the famous statement attributed to Louis XIV, ‘l’État c’est
moi!,’ supposedly spoken to the chairman of the French parliament on 22 December 1655.
Paradoxically, in spite of its ‘anti−citizenship’ traits, subjection was an important
step towards the development of the institution of state citizenship, because as 
a situation of subordination to a given authority and, at the same time, a situation
of being a member of a particular state, it constituted a clear outer differentiation
between locals and foreigners. In a feudal (estate) monarchy, the existence of municipal
citizenship, which provided a sort of asylum for runaways from the feudal system,
was an indicator of the internal division of the population within what was usually
one and the same ethnic community, even if differentiated in estate terms.15
Subjection in a state with distinct (which is not to say immutable) territorial
boundaries of monarchical authority clearly implied the membership and status
of a given population and served to shape national consciousness. 
324 Krzysztof Trzciński
15 It is worthwhile to note the specific role of the cities under absolutism. The almost 
exclusive concentration of power in the hands of an omnipotent monarch certainly had an
important impact on the economic development of urban centres. The growth of cities was
accompanied by their loss of political significance, however. Capital cities, however, were the
exception to this rule. Their establishment was inherently connected with the process of 
political centralization and their role – given the location within their walls of the seat of the
authorities and offices of the state administration – became unusually important. See 
R. Mackenney, Europa XVI wieku: Ekspansja i konflikt [Sixteenth Century Europe: Expansion
and Conflict], (Warsaw, 1997) 117. Generally speaking, the self−government of cities, so important
in the Middle Ages in light of the feudal and estate relations of the times, was slowly becoming
a thing of the past. The affluence of city dwellers attracted the attention of state rulers, and this
became a serious threat to municipal autonomy, a fact that manifested itself most often in the
form of increasingly heavy fiscal dues exacted by the state. For more on this subject, see 
T. Munck, Europa XVII wieku: 1598–1700. Państwo, konflikty i porządek społeczny
[Seventeenth Century Europe: State, Conflict and the Social Order in Europe, 1598–1700],
(Warsaw, 1998) 194. During the period of the ‘oligarchisation’ of city authorities, the majority
of city inhabitants were already deprived of any influence on the selection of their leaders, and
the political rights connected with local citizenship were slowly becoming history. With time,
certain burgher freedoms came to be included in the substance of nascent national law, in
which estate privileges were progressively abandoned. In principle, the modern state emerged
in opposition to municipal autonomy and municipal citizenship, whose system of privileges
was fast becoming anachronistic given the new situation. See R. Brubaker, Citizenship and
Nationhood in France and Germany, (Cambridge, 1992) 42. The absolutist regime did not provide
any special rights for any category of subjects, with the possible exception of the closest 
collaborators of the ruler, who, ex definitione, did not tolerate any signs of insubordination.
Autonomous cities could constitute a real threat to the ruler’s autocratic position. For this very
reason, in the period of absolutism, the citizens of cities became ordinary subjects of the
monarch. Without any wider possibility of choosing and controlling their representatives, they
could not have any real influence on their city’s obligations towards the king and the state. At
the same time, the patriciate, strengthened by the monarch’s protection, gained the possibility
of pursuing unbridled economic expansion at a time of rapid growth in trade and of geographical
discoveries, while a portion of the educated burghers could, in certain countries, occupy high
office in the state administration. See J. Delumeau, Cywilizacja Odrodzenia [La Civilisation de
la Renaissance], (Warsaw, 1987) 290. See also D. Richet, ‘Władza a społeczeństwo we Francji
u schyłku XVI wieku’ [‘Pouvoir et société à Paris au XVIIe siècle’] in Władza i społeczeństwo
w XVI i XVII w. [Power and Society in the 16th and 17th Century], a collective work, (Warsaw,
1989) 59–60.
We have already mentioned above that under the authority of a state ruled by
an omnipotent monarch the subject was only a surrogate citizen. Yet, in the 
thinking of such an apologist of absolutism as Jean Bodin there is room for 
a specific idea of a subject−citizen; this citizen was a member of a particular state,
but was usually devoid of political rights, and could not be active in the public
sphere. This model of citizenship certainly did not correspond to that proposed by
Aristotle. Nevertheless, the subject−citizen did enjoy personal freedom, his 
property was protected by law, and his point of reference was – in place of the
local community – the state (represented by the monarch) in which he lived and
with which he identified.16
Jean Bodin’s model of the citizen in the absolutist state 
Jean Bodin of Anjou is considered the architect of the founding concepts of
modern absolutism, which, however, ‘has no right to be a tyranny.’17 This 
outstanding French theoretician of the state presented – in The Six Books of the
Commonwealth, published in 1576 – a new model of the citizen understood 
as ‘a free subject who is dependent on the sovereignty of another [person]’ and
whose full freedom is ‘limited by the sovereign power to which he owes 
obedience.’18 This vision of the citizen emerged out of the understanding of 
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16 S.E. Finer in his voluminous work Empires, Monarchies and the Modern State, (Oxford,
1999) 1298, concludes that, in principle, a subject in an absolute monarchy can be called 
a citizen with limited rights. Finer is not alone in holding such an opinion. In order to define 
a community of citizens understood in such terms, the phrase ‘apolitical society of citizens,’ 
borrowed from R. Koselleck, seems most apt. See R. Koselleck, ‘Trzy światy obywatelskie?
Wprowadzenie do porównawczej semantyki społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Niemczech,
Anglii i Francji – zarys dziejów teorii’ [‘Three bürgerliche Worlds? Preliminary Theoretical−
−Historical Remarks on the Comparative Semantics of Civil Society in Germany, England, and
France’] in K. Michalski, ed., Europa i społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Rozmowy w Castel
Gandolfo [Europe and Civil Society: Talks in Castel Gandolfo], (Cracow, 1994) 115. Passive 
citizenship at the time of absolutism was supposedly based on the right to life, the personal
freedom of the individual, growing legalism, and respect for private property, which was often
considered inalienable and sacrosanct. All this together limited, in a way – albeit in a narrow
way – the autocratic rule of the monarch and defined boundaries to the general freedom of the
individual, who, consequently, was not just an object to be managed (for more on this subject,
see S.E. Finer, op. cit., 1298–1299). R. Kosseleck (op. cit., 115) even claims that a society could
exist of citizens deprived of influence upon the ruler – who was, however, ‘aiming for the 
public good.’ This opinion corresponds to the point of view adopted in the 16th century by Jean
Bodin. 
17 J. Baszkiewicz, F. Ryszka, Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych [A History of
Political and Legal Doctrines], (Warsaw, 1973) 182.
18 J. Bodin, Sześć ksiąg o Rzeczypospolitej [Six livres de la république], translated by 
R. Bierzanek, Z. Izdebski, and J. Wróblewski, (Warsaw, 1958) 48. Translated here from the
Polish.
sovereignty19 formulated by Bodin and constituting the key to his entire thinking.
It is a modern understanding of sovereignty as the unlimited and permanent 
sovereign authority of the state, in which the sovereign is the absolute monarch.
Bodin defined a state ruled by a just and moderate ruler and lawgiver by the term
civitas20 (a commonwealth understood as a state under the rule of law, but not 
a republic) – an association of citizens governed under the same laws and 
customs.21
In Bodin’s sovereign state, all inhabitants were subjects – which was supposed
to result from the natural state – but not all subjects could, at the same time, be
citizens. Bodin used the term citizen in connection with, primarily, the free 
subject, the opposite of a slave who, ‘in light of the law has no personality.’22 The
position of women and children in this scheme was rather peculiar, as their 
freedoms, particularly that of disposing of property, were limited by the domestic
authority of the head of the household, as in Roman law.23 For this reason, they
tended to remain basically passive citizens. Bodin also differentiated between 
natural citizens (subjects of the sovereign’s authority since birth), and naturalised
citizens. According to Bodin, a naturalised citizen was one who ‘voluntarily 
submits to the sovereign authority of another, and is accepted by him as his 
subject.’24 From a formal point of view, in order to acquire the status of citizen, it
was necessary, in this instance, to obtain letters of naturalisation (lettres de 
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19 The comparison is with the Roman understanding of sovereignty (such as that of Gaius),
made by A.J. Carlyle, Political Liberty: A History of Conception in the Middle Ages and Modern
Times, (Westport, 1980) 28.
20 Bodin does not clearly explain his own understanding of the concept of civitas, which he
defines using a legal term, he places it in opposition to the concept of a city, or refers to the 
tradition of the Roman civitas, or, he likens the concept to the meaning of Respublica. Despite
his critique of the Aristotelian understanding of the term ‘association of citizens,’ Bodin 
basically tends to define civitas using that notion, an example being his referral to the history
of Carthage, in which civitas existed despite the destruction of the city. See Bodin, op. cit., 51
and 53–57. On the subject of the translation of Bodin’s political terms, see also Z. Izdebski,
‘Poglądy Jana Bodinusa na państwo i prawo’ [‘Jean Bodin’s Views of the State and Law’], op.
cit., LXXV. See also A. Sylwestrzak, ‘Filozofia suwerenności i sprawiedliwości Bodinusa’
[‘Bodin’s Philosophy of Sovereignty and Justice’], Studia Prawnoustrojowe [Constitutional
Studies], No. 1, 2002: particularly 8, 11 and 21, for comments about the lack of clarity, 
consequence, or exact definition of terms in Bodin’s thinking.
21 The term res publica signified a state understood as a community aiming for the common
good of its members. See Q. Skinner, ‘Political Philosophy’ in C.B. Schmitt, ed., The Cambridge
History of Renaissance Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1992) 446–447.
22 J. Bodin, op. cit., 48.
23 Bodin attached great importance to the position of the family in the state. He claimed
that, without the family, the Respublica had no raison d’˜tre. In principle, relations in a state
ruled by a monarch reflected the situation in a family, since the public authority of the monarch
reflected, in a way, the private authority of a man as the head of the family.
24 J. Bodin, op. cit., 50.
naturalité) from the ruler.25 The acquisition of citizenship could take place in three
different ways: ‘naturally,’26 by way of naturalisation, or by liberation.27 The 
possession of citizen status was organically tied to subordination to the ruler and
the necessity of showing him practically boundless obedience. 
What thus differentiated Bodin’s subject of an absolute ruler from an
Aristotelian citizen? According to the Aristotelian concept referred to in the Six
Books, a citizen is he who participates in wielding power or in the administration
of justice, or has influence on the course of affairs in a state.28 Bodin claims, 
however, that ‘it would be a mistake to say that he who has no part in wielding
power or a deciding voice in popular assemblies, either in passing judgement or
in affairs of state, is not a citizen.’29 The French thinker was therefore definitely
against the vision of an active citizen equipped with political rights and he offered
instead the vision of the citizen as the beneficiary of natural liberty and certain
civitas rights and privileges, whose enjoyment was ‘dependent on the status 
and circumstances of every person, dependent on whether a given person is of
noble or common birth, whether woman or child, according to the age, sex, 
circumstances, and merits of each.’30
This leads us to two obvious conclusions. Firstly, in Bodin’s understanding, any
free subject possessing rights (i.e., not a slave) in an absolute monarchy was in
principle a citizen, and, secondly, citizens were not equal in the legal sense.
Therefore, Bodin did not provide for unified and universal citizenship status, but
rather for a qualified subject−citizen par excellence. The sum of the citizen’s
‘rights’ depended on social standing, i.e., on his or her belonging to a given estate,
and also on material situation, age, sex, and merits (that is, if they were of 
significant value for the state). This situation did not, in principle, preclude the
existence of the idea of a citizen who would be able to participate in public affairs
and in the making of decisions of importance for both the state and society. Such
a citizen was – very probably – a mature, affluent, serious, and meritorious man
from either the nobility or the burgher estate, who was one of those chosen by the
ruler to hold a state office. In an absolutist state, the number of such citizens was
limited to a narrow court elite, however. Such persons could be referred to as
active citizens – even where the role played by representative institutions was 
limited – if not for the fact that their position in the state was entirely dependent
on the will of the sovereign. 
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25 For more on this subject see ibid., 66.
26 Through birth to parents who were both subject−citizens, or in a relationship in which at
least one of the parents enjoyed the status of citizen.
27 In obtaining his personal freedom, a former slave was automatically supposed to assume
the citizenship of the state of his former master.
28 See Aristotle, Politics, particularly 1253a and 1275a. 
29 J. Bodin, op. cit., 57.
30 Ibid., 59.
The other part of the ‘citizen’ body put forward by Bodin was made up of 
a group of passive citizens who – while enjoying personal liberty and property
rights protected by law – were deprived of political rights, or, rather, of any 
influence on the course of the state’s affairs. The greater part of this community of
citizens thus remained apolitical. All citizens, however, enjoyed guarantees 
– originating with the sovereign, the all powerful and lifelong absolute ruler – of
protection,31 state stability,32 and prosperity. In addition to full obedience and
assistance to the sovereign, every subject−citizen had to bind himself to abide
unconditionally by all the laws instituted by the ruler. 
Thus, in analysing the essence of citizenship, Bodin came to the ultimately 
logical conclusion that privileges and rights could not form its principal 
substance, as these were not the same for all citizens.33 According to him, there
had never been a state in which all citizens enjoyed complete equality of rights,34
‘but always some possess more or less than others.’35 For him, citizenship has
rather the form of a political and legal status – the mutual obligation ‘of the 
sovereign towards his subjects, for whom, in exchange for loyalty and expressed
obedience, he is obliged to administer justice, and give council, provide 
assistance, support, and protection.’36 Only such a situation could form the basis
for the individual’s enjoyment of certain defined rights in the state, in keeping, of
course, with the individual’s aforementioned social position, understood in the
wide sense.37
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31 The protection of the ruler was supposed to provide, by means of the army and the law,
security for the persons, property, and families of the state’s members. For more on this subject,
see ibid, 81.
32 According to Bodin, a commonwealth was supposedly born in convulsion and violence,
and a sovereign ruler precluded a return to such a state.
33 Bodin claimed that, considering the variety of possible rights and privileges, one could
formulate thousands of definitions of the citizen. He thought, in addition, that if possessed rights
were to define the basic substance of citizenship, one could observe that in certain states 
foreigners were more citizens than the locals. In confirmation of this thesis he advanced (op.
cit., 69) the example of Florence, where a portion of the inhabitants requested the prince that
they be considered and treated as foreigners, on account of the freedom which foreigners
enjoyed. Compare with R.E. Goodin, ‘What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?,’
Ethics, No. 4, 1988: 667–671.
34 The best example here is the inequality in the fiscal condition and estate of state members.
For more on this subject, see Bodin, op. cit., 79.
35 Ibid., 80.
36 Ibid., 59.
37 Bodin also defined the citizen in light of the rights that set him above the foreigner. The
subject of a given sovereign did not have to incur various burdens that could be placed upon
a foreigner. We can only assume that the French thinker had certain fiscal burdens in mind,
even if the argumentation concerning this point presented in the République referred solely to
ancient Athens. Another issue was that of bequeathals and inheritance or, rather, limitations that
could be placed on foreigners in the area of ceding property rights. Bodin had recourse here to
The author of the Commonwealth claimed that, in principle, one could not
renounce one’s citizenship (except with the agreement of the sovereign), and 
a change of the subject’s place of residence did not in the least entail the 
cessation of the monarch’s sovereignty over his subject. Bodin wrote that ‘the
authority to limit and bind subjects is not at all connected with a [specific]
place.’38 The impossibility of simply losing one’s citizenship led to a lifetime bond
between the subject−citizen and the sovereign of a given state, even if other 
ties to the state itself no longer existed.39 Domicile thus seemed to have only 
a secondary significance in relation to subordination to the sovereign.
In the thinking of this French apologist for absolutism, certain limitations on
the absolute power of the ruler existed in the form of immutable – even sacred –
property rights, which were, at the same time, an important indicator of the 
liberty of the subject−citizen. Bodin claimed that ‘persons who are free and 
masters of their [own] property, if one wishes to bind them and appropriate that
which belongs to them, are easily stirred to revolt, as their hearts are bold and
nourished by liberty, not deprived by slavery.’40 In consequence, Bodin’s citizen
– with all his subordination to the sovereignty of the ruler – enjoyed a considerable
degree of independence, which was measured in terms of the value of the 
property he possessed.41 The opinion that, in Bodin’s thinking, wealth could 
constitute, for the subject−citizen of an absolute monarch, a force stifling his 
political aspirations, thus seems warranted. This seems an analogous situation to
that of the patriciate in the tyrannies of the Italian Renaissance, where the more
enlightened burghers sacrificed the freedoms of the civic life they had known on
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the old ius albanagii law which, as the droit d’aubaine, defined in France the right of the ruler
to confiscate the property of a deceased foreigner who had no legal heirs. Such a situation did
not arise very often, however, so that limitations concerning the heirs of the foreigner seemed
more significant. The heirs of the foreigner who were locals, regnicoles, had priority in the
inheritance (ibid., 74). This principle took the form of a special clause in letters of naturalisation.
The property of those foreigners who died in a country where they did not have heirs could 
be sequestrated in its entirety, something against which foreign merchants often fought by
securing special privileges (in this context, Bodin makes use of examples of immunities for 
foreign merchants visiting certain fairs in France. For more on this subject, see ibid., 75). One
more important difference between the citizen and the foreigner had to do with the droit de
marque. According to Bodin, this law only concerned foreigners and consisted in the possibility
of their being expelled from the country, both in times of peace and of war. 
38 Ibid., 78.
39 Bodin held that the state of citizenship arises out of the ties binding a subject−citizen to
a specific ruler, so that dual citizenship could only take place by means of an understanding
between the two sovereign monarchs concerned. The lack of such an agreement could lead to
a situation where the subject−citizen, in usurping the right to more than one citizenship, could
effectively avoid obedience to whomever.
40 Ibid., 264.
41 See G.L. Seidler, Myśl polityczna czasów nowożytnych [Political Thought in Modern
Times], (Cracow, 1972) 181.
the altar of benefits derived from holding lucrative administrative positions. Under
an absolute monarchy, ruling over wealthy subject−citizens could have seemed
easier than, for instance, under a feudal (estate) monarchy or under the English
monarchy, as wealthy subjects would have lost far more than they would have
gained by opposing an omnipotent ruler. Bodin’s citizen who had a considerable
estate could also – by way of paying taxes42 – share his wealth with the 
sovereign. In this context, Bodin stressed the necessity for the ruler to secure 
the agreement of his subject−citizens for taxation. Given the real situation under
absolutism such a requirement belonged in the realm of wishful thinking. 
B. Manning came to the following conclusion in writing about the financial 
problems of absolute monarchies: ‘the fundamental difference between the
English monarchy and the absolutism of the European continent […] is that the
King could not deprive his subjects of their property without their acquiescence
[expressed] through Parliament.’43 It is undeniable that any agreement on the part
of subject−citizens who were deprived of all parliamentary representation and
who were unequal in terms of rights and entirely subordinated to the ruler – as
was the case in Bodin’s absolutist state – was purely fictitious.
Final Remarks 
What have we learned from the concept of the subject−citizen in absolutism?
Primarily that the notion of ‘citizen’ had a different significance in different 
historical periods and forms of governments. Such a statement sounds like a mere
banality, yet who amongst us has not thought of the citizen of ancient Athens in
terms akin to the universal citizenship of our day? In this context, we often forget
that only a small group of individuals possessed full citizenship rights in Athens
and that liberty in the modern sense did not exist there. 
The understanding of the notion of ‘citizen’ and of the character of the entire
idea and institution of citizenship varies in Europe today, particularly at the plane
of discourse on legal theory. The essence of the controversy around the ‘purity’ of
the term seems to be the substance of citizenship. Ordinarily, by citizenship we
understand the nationality of the individual, associated with full participation – in
common with other individuals – in the rights and obligations defined by the legal
order of a given state.44 However, according to some analysts, citizenship is an
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42 Moderate taxes, to be sure, as Bodin was an outspoken supporter of fiscal freedom, 
considering taxes to constitute an infringement on the sanctity of private property. For more on
this subject, see Z. Izdebski, op. cit., XLVIII–XLIX.
43 B. Manning, ‘Szlachta, lud i ustrój’ [‘The Nobles, the People and the Constitution’] in
Geneza nowożytnej Anglii [The Genesis of Modern England], collected by A. Mączak,
(Warsaw, 1968) 448–449.
44 Let us refer to the definition of Z. Cybichowski, O pojęciu i istocie przynależności pań−
stwowej [On the Concept and Essence of Nationality], (Warsaw, 1920) 6, according to which
abstract condition and simply manifests itself in the individual’s membership in a
given state, i.e., the individual’s subordination to a specific state authority. This
view follows the thesis that the quintessence of citizenship is not formed by the
whole of a person’s rights and obligations in a state, but is rather its complement.
On this subject, J. Jagielski writes that ‘an argument against the inclusion of rights
and obligations within the framework of citizenship is [...] the absence of rights
and obligations objectively and exclusively connected with citizenship,’45 as even
political rights are also related to other factors, particularly that of age or place of
residence. Isn’t this approach reminiscent of Bodin’s concept of the political and
legal relationship – the tie connecting the citizen (the subject) to the state (the 
sovereign)? 
Opponents of such far−reaching comparisons would no doubt say that today 
a member of a state enjoys a considerably larger catalogue of rights than in the
days of absolute monarchy. This is indeed the case in principle, but, in practice,
is it the case in all the countries of the Old Continent? The citizen status of
individuals in democratic states differs from the citizen status of those under
non−democratic systems. The notion of citizenship also has its raison d’˜tre even
in state organisms where a stronger emphasis is placed on citizens’ obligations
than on citizens’ rights, although a considerable part of the latter is often protected
by law and respected in such states.46 The civic loyalty of the members of this
kind of state may be very firm and is more often connected with patriotism than
with the possibility of having an influence on the course of public affairs. Let 
us recall once again that subjection is a relationship of the whole of a state’s
inhabitants to the sovereign and the absolute authority of a monarch, a form of
political and legal tie between the individual and the state in which the subject is
primarily burdened with obligations, whereas the state authorities possess 
primarily rights. The analogies are obvious. 
At present, the term ‘subject’ appears in Europe in the sense of a citizen of 
a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy, in which the head of state is a king
or queen. The term ‘subject’ is used in Western European monarchies interchangeably
with the notion of ‘citizen.’47 In the case of the members of a state which 
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the ‘right to citizenship invariably rests on nationality, but extends further, including also partici−
pation in the public life of the state.’
45 J. Jagielski, Obywatelstwo polskie. Zagadnienia podstawowe [Polish Citizenship: Basic
Issues], (Warsaw, 1998) 14.
46 K. Wojtaszczyk, Kompendium wiedzy o państwie współczesnym [Compendium of
Knowledge on the Contemporary State], (Warsaw, 1999) 69, writes that ‘in a democratic state,
the primacy of the individual over the state is assumed, whereas in a non−democratic state, the
state has priority over the individual.’
47 J. Szreniawski, ‘Podstawowe problemy prawne obywatelstwa’   [‘Basic Legal Problems of
Citizenship’] in Konstytucyjny ustrój państwa. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Wiesława
has a non−democratic form of government, one does not use the term ‘subject.’
But are not the citizens of certain East European countries reminiscent of the 
subject−citizens of Bodin’s commonwealth? Is the thinking of the French philosopher
really obsolete? If the question remains open as to whether absolute monarchies
had citizens, it might be worthwhile to ponder the question of whether, in some
present European states where rulers behave as if they were independent princes,
we are not still dealing with subjects? Perhaps we should just call them ‘members
of a state,’ but not citizens. This is an interesting question and is not merely
semantic in nature.
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Skrzydły [The Constitutional System of a State: Studies Dedicated to Professor Wiesław
Skrzydło], (Lublin, 2000) 297, indicates that in Great Britain, for example, this does not 
concern the term ‘subjection,’ which was simply replaced, after World War II, by the term 
‘citizenship.’
